IN SOME corners of thecommercial-property market a slight whiff of self-congratulation isin the air. Doom-laden warnings issued in 2008 and early 2009 thatcommercial real estate would be the next shoe to drop have notcome to pass. Opportunistic investors hoping to cash in on the sale ofdistressed assets have been largely disappointed. Governments haveintervened less than they have in housing . Commercial real estate wasnot at the heart of the crisis, says a big fund manager in Germany.

　　在商業(yè)地產(chǎn)市場的某些角落里，空氣中漂浮著一絲自得的氣息。商業(yè)地產(chǎn)將會是下一只掉落的鞋子這條2008年和2009年初發(fā)出的警告并沒有最終成為現(xiàn)實。那些希望靠出售問題資產(chǎn)賺錢的機會型投資者多半沮喪而歸。政府對商業(yè)地產(chǎn)的干預比對住宅所做的干預要少。商業(yè)地產(chǎn)不是這次危機的中心， 德國一個大型基金的經(jīng)理人這樣說。

　　Investors interest in the asset class is growing, thanks in large partto the extreme macroeconomic environment. Near-zero interestrates make the yields on offer from property look attractive. The cashflow from tenants ismore stable than that from equities, where values zigzag day by day and dividends cansuddenly be suspended by the management. And unlike many types of bonds, property isseen as a useful hedge against inflation because rental agreements can be renegotiated withtenants to reflect rising prices. Bulls note that Norways $543 billion state pension fund, one ofthe worlds largest sovereign-wealth funds, is starting to allocate money to property. It madeits first real-estate investment in January, spending ￡452m on properties in LondonsRegent Street.

　　投資者對資產(chǎn)類別的興趣正在增加，很大一部分原因是極端的宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境。近于零的利率使得房產(chǎn)提供的收益看起來很具吸引力。來自承租者的現(xiàn)金流比來自股票的更穩(wěn)定，后者的價值日復一日地曲折前行，而且紅利可能突然就被管理方中止。而且和許多類型的債券不同，房地產(chǎn)被看作是對沖通脹的利器，因為可以與承租者重新協(xié)商租賃協(xié)議，以此來反映上漲的物價。看漲者們注意到，挪威5430億美元的政府養(yǎng)老金正在開始向房地產(chǎn)分配資金。該基金在一月份進行了第一筆房地產(chǎn)投資，把4.52億英鎊投在倫敦麗晶街上的房產(chǎn)。

　　Led by Britain, which had seen the steepest fall ofthe big property markets , values arerising again. According to IPD, which providesinformation on property markets, Britishcommercial property delivered a total return of15.2% in 2010, its strongest performance for fouryears. Investing in property has paid offhandsomely for many since late 2009. Global REITsperformed twice as well as global stocks and bondsin the 12 months to the end of September 2010.Take a closer look at this resurgence, however, andthe picture becomes more complicated.

　　經(jīng)歷了商業(yè)房產(chǎn)巨幅下跌的英國正在帶領商業(yè)房產(chǎn)的價值再次攀升。根據(jù)IPD提供的房地產(chǎn)市場信息，英國商業(yè)地產(chǎn)市場2010年的總回報率為15.2%，是四年來表現(xiàn)最為強勁的一年。對于很多人來說，自2009年末以來，投資房地產(chǎn)收益頗豐。在截止到2010年九月的12個月里，全球房地產(chǎn)投資信托的表現(xiàn)要好過全球股票和債券的兩倍之多。但是如果近距離看這次復蘇，情況將變得更為復雜。

　　In one crucial respect, the bubble in commercial property was less dangerous than in theresidential sector: there was no development boom and hence no oversupply. The enormousamount of liquidity sloshing around the system was directed at acquiring existing propertiesrather than building new ones. This was an excess of capital, not an excess of cranes, saysJonathan Gray, the boss of Blackstones real-estate business.

　　一個關鍵點是，商業(yè)房產(chǎn)的泡沫不如住宅板塊的泡沫危險：沒有開發(fā)熱，因此也就沒有過度供給。該系統(tǒng)周圍龐大充盈的流動資金被用于購買已有的房產(chǎn)，而不是用于新建。這是資金的過剩，不是起重機的過剩，黑石集團房地產(chǎn)業(yè)務總裁喬納森格雷說。

　　That flood of money drove up debt burdens and property values and reduced yields . Madness became routine: the 110% loan-to-value financing for a hotel in Germany, offered to a borrower with no knowledge of eitherhotels or Germany; the fact that yields on Grafton Street in central Dublin, hardly a retailparadise, came close to those in some of the worlds most prestigious shopping streets; thewillingness of staid fund managers to base their investment case on capital gains rather thanrental growth.

　　這些流動資金增加了債務負擔和房產(chǎn)價值，減小了投資收益。瘋狂成為常態(tài)：在德國，貸款投資一家酒店的貸款價值比達110%，而借款方既不懂酒店，也不懂德國;都柏林市中心的格拉芙頓街很難說得上是一個購物天堂，但是那里的投資收益接近世界上最知名的購物街;古板的基金經(jīng)理更愿意讓他們的投資案例憑借資本收益獲得成功，而不是靠租金的增長。

　　If the market had been left to run for a little longer, it might have become crazier still. Justbefore the crisis broke, there had been talk of securities made up exclusively of riskierdevelopment loans. But in contrast to the overbuilding of the early 1990s, when rapid rentalgrowth persuaded developers to dig lots of holes in the ground, this time lenders and investorswere disciplined enough to want income-producing properties; they were just not disciplinedenough to price the risks correctly.

　　如果這個市場當時再持續(xù)一段時間，可能還會變得更瘋狂。就在危機爆發(fā)之前，曾討論過完全由高風險的開發(fā)貸款所構(gòu)成的債券。但是和1990年代的過度開發(fā)相反，這次貸款者和投資者頭腦還是足夠清醒，他們想要的是投資型的房產(chǎn);他們只是在正確計算風險上頭腦不夠清醒。

　　IN SOME corners of thecommercial-property market a slight whiff of self-congratulation isin the air. Doom-laden warnings issued in 2008 and early 2009 thatcommercial real estate would be the next shoe to drop have notcome to pass. Opportunistic investors hoping to cash in on the sale ofdistressed assets have been largely disappointed. Governments haveintervened less than they have in housing . Commercial real estate wasnot at the heart of the crisis, says a big fund manager in Germany.

　　在商業(yè)地產(chǎn)市場的某些角落里，空氣中漂浮著一絲自得的氣息。商業(yè)地產(chǎn)將會是下一只掉落的鞋子這條2008年和2009年初發(fā)出的警告并沒有最終成為現(xiàn)實。那些希望靠出售問題資產(chǎn)賺錢的機會型投資者多半沮喪而歸。政府對商業(yè)地產(chǎn)的干預比對住宅所做的干預要少。商業(yè)地產(chǎn)不是這次危機的中心， 德國一個大型基金的經(jīng)理人這樣說。

　　Investors interest in the asset class is growing, thanks in large partto the extreme macroeconomic environment. Near-zero interestrates make the yields on offer from property look attractive. The cashflow from tenants ismore stable than that from equities, where values zigzag day by day and dividends cansuddenly be suspended by the management. And unlike many types of bonds, property isseen as a useful hedge against inflation because rental agreements can be renegotiated withtenants to reflect rising prices. Bulls note that Norways $543 billion state pension fund, one ofthe worlds largest sovereign-wealth funds, is starting to allocate money to property. It madeits first real-estate investment in January, spending ￡452m on properties in LondonsRegent Street.

　　投資者對資產(chǎn)類別的興趣正在增加，很大一部分原因是極端的宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境。近于零的利率使得房產(chǎn)提供的收益看起來很具吸引力。來自承租者的現(xiàn)金流比來自股票的更穩(wěn)定，后者的價值日復一日地曲折前行，而且紅利可能突然就被管理方中止。而且和許多類型的債券不同，房地產(chǎn)被看作是對沖通脹的利器，因為可以與承租者重新協(xié)商租賃協(xié)議，以此來反映上漲的物價。看漲者們注意到，挪威5430億美元的政府養(yǎng)老金正在開始向房地產(chǎn)分配資金。該基金在一月份進行了第一筆房地產(chǎn)投資，把4.52億英鎊投在倫敦麗晶街上的房產(chǎn)。

　　Led by Britain, which had seen the steepest fall ofthe big property markets , values arerising again. According to IPD, which providesinformation on property markets, Britishcommercial property delivered a total return of15.2% in 2010, its strongest performance for fouryears. Investing in property has paid offhandsomely for many since late 2009. Global REITsperformed twice as well as global stocks and bondsin the 12 months to the end of September 2010.Take a closer look at this resurgence, however, andthe picture becomes more complicated.

　　經(jīng)歷了商業(yè)房產(chǎn)巨幅下跌的英國正在帶領商業(yè)房產(chǎn)的價值再次攀升。根據(jù)IPD提供的房地產(chǎn)市場信息，英國商業(yè)地產(chǎn)市場2010年的總回報率為15.2%，是四年來表現(xiàn)最為強勁的一年。對于很多人來說，自2009年末以來，投資房地產(chǎn)收益頗豐。在截止到2010年九月的12個月里，全球房地產(chǎn)投資信托的表現(xiàn)要好過全球股票和債券的兩倍之多。但是如果近距離看這次復蘇，情況將變得更為復雜。

　　In one crucial respect, the bubble in commercial property was less dangerous than in theresidential sector: there was no development boom and hence no oversupply. The enormousamount of liquidity sloshing around the system was directed at acquiring existing propertiesrather than building new ones. This was an excess of capital, not an excess of cranes, saysJonathan Gray, the boss of Blackstones real-estate business.

　　一個關鍵點是，商業(yè)房產(chǎn)的泡沫不如住宅板塊的泡沫危險：沒有開發(fā)熱，因此也就沒有過度供給。該系統(tǒng)周圍龐大充盈的流動資金被用于購買已有的房產(chǎn)，而不是用于新建。這是資金的過剩，不是起重機的過剩，黑石集團房地產(chǎn)業(yè)務總裁喬納森格雷說。

　　That flood of money drove up debt burdens and property values and reduced yields . Madness became routine: the 110% loan-to-value financing for a hotel in Germany, offered to a borrower with no knowledge of eitherhotels or Germany; the fact that yields on Grafton Street in central Dublin, hardly a retailparadise, came close to those in some of the worlds most prestigious shopping streets; thewillingness of staid fund managers to base their investment case on capital gains rather thanrental growth.

　　這些流動資金增加了債務負擔和房產(chǎn)價值，減小了投資收益。瘋狂成為常態(tài)：在德國，貸款投資一家酒店的貸款價值比達110%，而借款方既不懂酒店，也不懂德國;都柏林市中心的格拉芙頓街很難說得上是一個購物天堂，但是那里的投資收益接近世界上最知名的購物街;古板的基金經(jīng)理更愿意讓他們的投資案例憑借資本收益獲得成功，而不是靠租金的增長。

　　If the market had been left to run for a little longer, it might have become crazier still. Justbefore the crisis broke, there had been talk of securities made up exclusively of riskierdevelopment loans. But in contrast to the overbuilding of the early 1990s, when rapid rentalgrowth persuaded developers to dig lots of holes in the ground, this time lenders and investorswere disciplined enough to want income-producing properties; they were just not disciplinedenough to price the risks correctly.

　　如果這個市場當時再持續(xù)一段時間，可能還會變得更瘋狂。就在危機爆發(fā)之前，曾討論過完全由高風險的開發(fā)貸款所構(gòu)成的債券。但是和1990年代的過度開發(fā)相反，這次貸款者和投資者頭腦還是足夠清醒，他們想要的是投資型的房產(chǎn);他們只是在正確計算風險上頭腦不夠清醒。