A firewall fullof holes

　　歐元危機;漏洞百出的防火墻;

　　The euro zone s rescue strategy still does not addup;

　　歐元區救助策略依然一盤散沙;

　　There is a new swagger among European financialofficials these days. As bond spreads narrow, shareprices rise and the euro strengthens, manypolicymakers are convinced the crisis has beensolved. At a G20 gathering of finance ministers inMexico City on February 25th-26th, for instance, the European delegates were touting theirsuccess. It is a far cry from the browbeatings they suffered during 2011.

　　當前，歐洲財政官員們流露出新的自大情緒。隨著債券息差縮小，股票價格上漲，歐元勢頭強勁，眾多決策者堅信這場危機已經終結。如2月25日-26日在墨西哥城召開的20國財長會議上，歐洲代表不斷吹噓他們的成功。這與他們2011年危機中恐懼的樣子可真是天壤之別。

　　This mood of confidence can largely be credited to the European Central Bank and itsprovision of liquidity to banks. But add in Greeces second bail-out deal, tough neweuro-zone fiscal rules, bold reforms in Italy and Spain andso the argument goesit isclear that the Europeans are serious about fixing their problems. Just in case, the imminentintroduction of the European Stability Mechanism , a permanent rescue fund, as wellas an increase in the IMFs resources, also mean that a solid firewall is being erected to copewith another conflagration.

　　這種自信情緒很大程度上要歸因于歐洲央行及其向銀行提供的流動資金。但是，一些人還考慮到第二輪對希臘的救助、強硬的歐元區新財政政策以及意大利和西班牙大刀闊斧的改革，因此出現了一種說法：歐洲顯然是真的想解決問題。為了以防萬一，歐洲即將推出一項永久救助基金歐洲穩定機制，國際貨幣基金組織也將增加其資金，這意味著一道堅實的防火墻正在豎起，以應對另一場大火。

　　Unfortunately, with one exception, every part of that argument is weaker than it looks. Theexception is the ECBs Long Term Refinancing Operation , which provides banks withthree-year liquidity at its main interest rate, currently 1%, against a wide array ofcollateral. On February 29th the ECB announced that it had lent another EURO530 billion, taking the amount of three-year money it has pumped into the banking systemover the past two months or so to more than EURO1 trillion . It is hardly surprisingthat markets are perkier.

　　可惜的是，這種說法的每個方面都沒有看起來那么堅實，但其中有一項是例外。這個例外就是歐洲中央銀行的長期再融資操作，LTRO按其主導利率，在銀行提供大量的抵押品作為擔保的情況下，向其提供三年期流動資金來，當前主導利率為1%。2月29日，歐洲央行宣布又借出5300億歐元，這一舉措使其在近兩個多月的時間內向銀行系統注入的三年期資金超過1萬億歐元。難怪市場會變得更加傲慢。

　　The amount lent at the second auction was slightly higher than expected, and went to farmore banks than the initial auction in December. Since so many small banks have nowtapped LTRO, hopes are rising that as well as slowing the pace of bank deleveraging andpropping up sovereign-bond markets, the liquidity may encourage new lending to the realeconomy.

　　第二次競標的貸款量略高于此前預期，獲得貸款的銀行數量也大大超過12月的首次競標。LTRO不僅放緩了銀行減債的步伐，支撐了主權債券市場，同時也因為眾多小型銀行現已從LTRO獲得資金，人們越來越期望流動資金能夠刺激新貸款流向實體經濟。

　　It might, but all that money could also have nasty long-term side-effects. Hawks at the ECBare already muttering about the problem of banks becoming addicted to cheap central-bankfunds. And by encouraging Italian or Spanish banks to buy their governments bonds, LTROreinforces the close links between the peripheral economies sovereign debt and the healthof their banks.

　　三年期貸款可能有這種作用，但也可能產生長期的負面影響。歐洲央行的鷹派已經開始抱怨各國銀行沉溺于央行的廉價基金。三年期貸款刺激了意大利或者西班牙用所獲資金購買國債，將次要經濟體主權債務與其銀行健康狀況捆綁得更緊。

　　LTRO has bought time, however. So, too, has Greeces latest rescue package. GermanysBundestag approved its share of the funds on February 27th. The temporary downgradeof Greek bonds to selective default, as a result of moves to restructure private creditorsdebt, has caused few ripples. In the short term a chaotic default has almost certainly beenavoided. But few believe the Greek rescue plan will actually work. Eventually Greece willeither need more help from its rescuers or will face default and perhaps an exit from theeuro.

　　但是，LTRO買的是時間。最新一次希臘救助計劃也是如此。2月27日，德國聯邦議院批準了德國在該基金中承擔的份額。希臘調整私人債權人債務的一系列動作導致其債券被臨時降級為選擇性違約，但卻沒有什么影響。短期看來，希臘幾乎不可能出現違約動蕩。但是，也幾乎沒有人相信希臘救助計劃真的管用。最終，希臘要么向救助者尋求更多幫助，要么面臨違約，也許還要退出歐元區。

　　What matters, therefore, is how well the euro zone uses the time it has bought itself. Thesigns are worrying. Policymakers overwhelming focus on budgetausterity is facing increasing resistance. Spain announced on February 27th that its 2011budget deficit, at 8.5% of GDP, was even bigger than first expected. It wants to renegotiatethe 2023 deficit target of 4.4% of GDP.

　　因此，關鍵是看歐元區怎么用好自己買到的時間。現在的跡象令人擔憂。決策者誤入歧途，過分強調預算緊縮，現在面臨了越來越多的抵抗。2月27日，西班牙宣布其2011年預算赤字為GDP的8.5%，高于先期預測。西班牙欲就其2023年的赤字目標進行重新協商，該目標為GDP的4.4%。

　　More worrying still is the lack of progress in building permanent defenses against a loss ofconfidence in another sovereigns bonds. Much faith is placed in the ESM, to be launched onJuly 1st. This EURO500 billion fund is supposedly stronger than the current iteration, theEuropean Financial Stability Facility , because it is enshrined in legal treaties andbecause EURO80 billion of its capital will eventually be paid in, whereas the EFSF relies onguarantees. Although Germany still resists, most euro-zone members hope to run both fundssimultaneously, which implies a theoretical cash-chest of EURO750 billion.

　　更令人擔心的還是針對另一種主權債券信心缺失的永久防御建設未取得進展。很多人寄希望于7月1日將啟動的歐洲穩定機制。這筆5000億歐元的資金可能比當前的機制歐洲金融穩定基金更為有力，因為ESM有法律條約作保障，并且其800億歐元資本最終會兌現，而不是像EFSF那樣只靠擔保。盡管德國依然反對，但大部分歐元區成員國都希望兩項基金同時運行，若同時運行，將意味著理論上會有7500億歐元的基金。

　　The trouble is that this money is not actually to hand. The EFSF, whose AA+ credit rating wasput on negative watch by Standard Poors this week, must find its funds in the bondmarkets, and there is little evidence that it can raise a lot of money fast. And cash-strappedcountries, such as France, are reluctant to pay in a lot of capital to the ESM quickly.

　　問題是這筆錢還沒有到手。信用等級為AA+的EFSF本周被標準普爾公司設為負面觀察，EFSF必須要在債券市場找到資本，但是還沒有跡象表明EFSF可以快速籌到巨款。而資金短缺的國家，如法國，不愿意立即向ESM大量注資。

　　The Europeans reluctance to put a hefty amount of real money at risk has weakened thesecond part of the firewall, the IMFs resources. In Mexico City G20 members made it clearthat they would not stump up cash for the fund until there was a credible commitmentfrom Europe.

　　歐洲國家不愿意冒險投入大量現款，這一點削弱了防火墻的第二部分國際貨幣基金組織的資金源。在墨西哥城召開的G20會議上，成員國明確表示在歐洲國家做出可靠承諾前，他們不會向該基金注資。

　　Worse, even if it were fully in place, this is still a rather flimsy sort of defence. Relying onvast infusions of money from the IMF could actually worsen the problems of a country likeItaly, since the funds presumed preferred-creditor status would push privatebondholders further down the pecking order. Nor are the amounts being talked about enoughto remove the risk of panic. As Willem Buiter of Citigroup points out, the weaker membersof the euro zone collectively need to borrow some EURO2 trillion over the next two years.

　　更不妙的是，即使資金全部就緒，這也只能是一層脆弱的抵御。事實上，依靠IMF灌入大量資金對于像意大利這樣的國家來說會將問題惡化，因為該基金的預期優先債權人身份會將私人債券持有人推向更低的社會等級。這筆數目也不足以消除出現大恐慌的風險。正如花期公司的維勒姆?布提爾指出的那樣，在未來兩年內，歐元區較脆弱的成員國共需借款2萬億歐元左右。

　　To get properly on top of its debt problem, Europe needs to be bolder. A growing chorusargues that this must entail some form of joint liability for countries debts. A proposalfrom the German Council of Economic Experts for a European Debt Redemption Fund, whichwould mutualize all euro-zone members debts above 60% of GDP, with strict rules to paythem off over 25 years, is gaining traction in some quarters. Germany itself remainsstaunchly opposed to anything that smells of Eurobonds, and the current period of calm hasonly reinforced that resistance. Meanwhile, the clock ticks.

　　要想恰當地處理好債務問題，歐洲還需要更加大刀闊斧。越來越多的人認為歐洲國家需要為債務問題負連帶責任。德國經濟專家委員會提出的歐洲債務贖回基金的建議在部分地區得到了響應。該基金吸收了歐元區各國債務占GDP 60%以外的部分，制定嚴格的制度使他們在25年內還清。德國本身堅決反對任何帶有歐洲債券味道的東西，當前的風平浪靜只是增強了這種抵抗。與此同時，鐘表指針滴滴答答地走著。

　　A firewall fullof holes

　　歐元危機;漏洞百出的防火墻;

　　The euro zone s rescue strategy still does not addup;

　　歐元區救助策略依然一盤散沙;

　　There is a new swagger among European financialofficials these days. As bond spreads narrow, shareprices rise and the euro strengthens, manypolicymakers are convinced the crisis has beensolved. At a G20 gathering of finance ministers inMexico City on February 25th-26th, for instance, the European delegates were touting theirsuccess. It is a far cry from the browbeatings they suffered during 2011.

　　當前，歐洲財政官員們流露出新的自大情緒。隨著債券息差縮小，股票價格上漲，歐元勢頭強勁，眾多決策者堅信這場危機已經終結。如2月25日-26日在墨西哥城召開的20國財長會議上，歐洲代表不斷吹噓他們的成功。這與他們2011年危機中恐懼的樣子可真是天壤之別。

　　This mood of confidence can largely be credited to the European Central Bank and itsprovision of liquidity to banks. But add in Greeces second bail-out deal, tough neweuro-zone fiscal rules, bold reforms in Italy and Spain andso the argument goesit isclear that the Europeans are serious about fixing their problems. Just in case, the imminentintroduction of the European Stability Mechanism , a permanent rescue fund, as wellas an increase in the IMFs resources, also mean that a solid firewall is being erected to copewith another conflagration.

　　這種自信情緒很大程度上要歸因于歐洲央行及其向銀行提供的流動資金。但是，一些人還考慮到第二輪對希臘的救助、強硬的歐元區新財政政策以及意大利和西班牙大刀闊斧的改革，因此出現了一種說法：歐洲顯然是真的想解決問題。為了以防萬一，歐洲即將推出一項永久救助基金歐洲穩定機制，國際貨幣基金組織也將增加其資金，這意味著一道堅實的防火墻正在豎起，以應對另一場大火。

　　Unfortunately, with one exception, every part of that argument is weaker than it looks. Theexception is the ECBs Long Term Refinancing Operation , which provides banks withthree-year liquidity at its main interest rate, currently 1%, against a wide array ofcollateral. On February 29th the ECB announced that it had lent another EURO530 billion, taking the amount of three-year money it has pumped into the banking systemover the past two months or so to more than EURO1 trillion . It is hardly surprisingthat markets are perkier.

　　可惜的是，這種說法的每個方面都沒有看起來那么堅實，但其中有一項是例外。這個例外就是歐洲中央銀行的長期再融資操作，LTRO按其主導利率，在銀行提供大量的抵押品作為擔保的情況下，向其提供三年期流動資金來，當前主導利率為1%。2月29日，歐洲央行宣布又借出5300億歐元，這一舉措使其在近兩個多月的時間內向銀行系統注入的三年期資金超過1萬億歐元。難怪市場會變得更加傲慢。

　　The amount lent at the second auction was slightly higher than expected, and went to farmore banks than the initial auction in December. Since so many small banks have nowtapped LTRO, hopes are rising that as well as slowing the pace of bank deleveraging andpropping up sovereign-bond markets, the liquidity may encourage new lending to the realeconomy.

　　第二次競標的貸款量略高于此前預期，獲得貸款的銀行數量也大大超過12月的首次競標。LTRO不僅放緩了銀行減債的步伐，支撐了主權債券市場，同時也因為眾多小型銀行現已從LTRO獲得資金，人們越來越期望流動資金能夠刺激新貸款流向實體經濟。

　　It might, but all that money could also have nasty long-term side-effects. Hawks at the ECBare already muttering about the problem of banks becoming addicted to cheap central-bankfunds. And by encouraging Italian or Spanish banks to buy their governments bonds, LTROreinforces the close links between the peripheral economies sovereign debt and the healthof their banks.

　　三年期貸款可能有這種作用，但也可能產生長期的負面影響。歐洲央行的鷹派已經開始抱怨各國銀行沉溺于央行的廉價基金。三年期貸款刺激了意大利或者西班牙用所獲資金購買國債，將次要經濟體主權債務與其銀行健康狀況捆綁得更緊。

　　LTRO has bought time, however. So, too, has Greeces latest rescue package. GermanysBundestag approved its share of the funds on February 27th. The temporary downgradeof Greek bonds to selective default, as a result of moves to restructure private creditorsdebt, has caused few ripples. In the short term a chaotic default has almost certainly beenavoided. But few believe the Greek rescue plan will actually work. Eventually Greece willeither need more help from its rescuers or will face default and perhaps an exit from theeuro.

　　但是，LTRO買的是時間。最新一次希臘救助計劃也是如此。2月27日，德國聯邦議院批準了德國在該基金中承擔的份額。希臘調整私人債權人債務的一系列動作導致其債券被臨時降級為選擇性違約，但卻沒有什么影響。短期看來，希臘幾乎不可能出現違約動蕩。但是，也幾乎沒有人相信希臘救助計劃真的管用。最終，希臘要么向救助者尋求更多幫助，要么面臨違約，也許還要退出歐元區。

　　What matters, therefore, is how well the euro zone uses the time it has bought itself. Thesigns are worrying. Policymakers overwhelming focus on budgetausterity is facing increasing resistance. Spain announced on February 27th that its 2011budget deficit, at 8.5% of GDP, was even bigger than first expected. It wants to renegotiatethe 2023 deficit target of 4.4% of GDP.

　　因此，關鍵是看歐元區怎么用好自己買到的時間。現在的跡象令人擔憂。決策者誤入歧途，過分強調預算緊縮，現在面臨了越來越多的抵抗。2月27日，西班牙宣布其2011年預算赤字為GDP的8.5%，高于先期預測。西班牙欲就其2023年的赤字目標進行重新協商，該目標為GDP的4.4%。

　　More worrying still is the lack of progress in building permanent defenses against a loss ofconfidence in another sovereigns bonds. Much faith is placed in the ESM, to be launched onJuly 1st. This EURO500 billion fund is supposedly stronger than the current iteration, theEuropean Financial Stability Facility , because it is enshrined in legal treaties andbecause EURO80 billion of its capital will eventually be paid in, whereas the EFSF relies onguarantees. Although Germany still resists, most euro-zone members hope to run both fundssimultaneously, which implies a theoretical cash-chest of EURO750 billion.

　　更令人擔心的還是針對另一種主權債券信心缺失的永久防御建設未取得進展。很多人寄希望于7月1日將啟動的歐洲穩定機制。這筆5000億歐元的資金可能比當前的機制歐洲金融穩定基金更為有力，因為ESM有法律條約作保障，并且其800億歐元資本最終會兌現，而不是像EFSF那樣只靠擔保。盡管德國依然反對，但大部分歐元區成員國都希望兩項基金同時運行，若同時運行，將意味著理論上會有7500億歐元的基金。

　　The trouble is that this money is not actually to hand. The EFSF, whose AA+ credit rating wasput on negative watch by Standard Poors this week, must find its funds in the bondmarkets, and there is little evidence that it can raise a lot of money fast. And cash-strappedcountries, such as France, are reluctant to pay in a lot of capital to the ESM quickly.

　　問題是這筆錢還沒有到手。信用等級為AA+的EFSF本周被標準普爾公司設為負面觀察，EFSF必須要在債券市場找到資本，但是還沒有跡象表明EFSF可以快速籌到巨款。而資金短缺的國家，如法國，不愿意立即向ESM大量注資。

　　The Europeans reluctance to put a hefty amount of real money at risk has weakened thesecond part of the firewall, the IMFs resources. In Mexico City G20 members made it clearthat they would not stump up cash for the fund until there was a credible commitmentfrom Europe.

　　歐洲國家不愿意冒險投入大量現款，這一點削弱了防火墻的第二部分國際貨幣基金組織的資金源。在墨西哥城召開的G20會議上，成員國明確表示在歐洲國家做出可靠承諾前，他們不會向該基金注資。

　　Worse, even if it were fully in place, this is still a rather flimsy sort of defence. Relying onvast infusions of money from the IMF could actually worsen the problems of a country likeItaly, since the funds presumed preferred-creditor status would push privatebondholders further down the pecking order. Nor are the amounts being talked about enoughto remove the risk of panic. As Willem Buiter of Citigroup points out, the weaker membersof the euro zone collectively need to borrow some EURO2 trillion over the next two years.

　　更不妙的是，即使資金全部就緒，這也只能是一層脆弱的抵御。事實上，依靠IMF灌入大量資金對于像意大利這樣的國家來說會將問題惡化，因為該基金的預期優先債權人身份會將私人債券持有人推向更低的社會等級。這筆數目也不足以消除出現大恐慌的風險。正如花期公司的維勒姆?布提爾指出的那樣，在未來兩年內，歐元區較脆弱的成員國共需借款2萬億歐元左右。

　　To get properly on top of its debt problem, Europe needs to be bolder. A growing chorusargues that this must entail some form of joint liability for countries debts. A proposalfrom the German Council of Economic Experts for a European Debt Redemption Fund, whichwould mutualize all euro-zone members debts above 60% of GDP, with strict rules to paythem off over 25 years, is gaining traction in some quarters. Germany itself remainsstaunchly opposed to anything that smells of Eurobonds, and the current period of calm hasonly reinforced that resistance. Meanwhile, the clock ticks.

　　要想恰當地處理好債務問題，歐洲還需要更加大刀闊斧。越來越多的人認為歐洲國家需要為債務問題負連帶責任。德國經濟專家委員會提出的歐洲債務贖回基金的建議在部分地區得到了響應。該基金吸收了歐元區各國債務占GDP 60%以外的部分，制定嚴格的制度使他們在25年內還清。德國本身堅決反對任何帶有歐洲債券味道的東西，當前的風平浪靜只是增強了這種抵抗。與此同時，鐘表指針滴滴答答地走著。